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After the start of transition, in Central European Economies the
restructuring process of large state enterprizes was accompanied by
high unemployment all through the '90s. Social policy expenditures,
particularly targeted to the non-employed, grew faster than expected
due to the need to ¯nance the out-of-labor categories. The reallocation
of workers from the state to the private sector called for the establish-
ment of an adequate social safety net. In this paper, unemployment
dynamics, speed of transition and non-employment policies are mod-
elled based on the assumption that the labor force is shrinking over
time. Dismissed workers have the opportunity to choose an outside-
option, i.e. an alternative to the labor force participation. Individual
uncertainty is assumed in a ¯rst phase of the model, while aggregate
uncertainty generating opposition to restructuring is modelled in a
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the title 'Optimal Speed of Transition with a Shrinking Labor Force and under Uncer-
tainty'. The author wishes to thank Tito Boeri, Michael Castanhaira, Fabrizio Coricelli,
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1second phase. The model predicts a slow down of the speed of transi-
tion. Starting from 1992, after the reforms concerning Passive Labor
Market Policies (PLMPs), a reduced pace of transition appeared: the
reasons why this happened have not yet been explained by the Opti-
mal Speed of Transition (OST) literature.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: J41, H53, P26
Keywords: Unemployment, Model of Transition, Social Safety Net.
21 Introduction
The reasons why di®erent Central European Economies (CEEs) experienced
di®erent speeds of transition are still being studied. The debate on gradu-
alism versus shock therapy has been very lively and has not led to a clear
consensus view, as stated by Arrow (2000) and Roland (2002), among others
scholars.
At the beginning of 1992 social policy reforms were adopted by CEEs in
order to accelerate the process of reallocation of workers. The unemployment
bene¯ts replacement rate was indeed reduced. Unfortunately, this change was
accompanied by: an increase of other social policy costs, a decrease in the
participation rate and a slower speed of transition.
CEEs are still exposed to the risk of paying too much for the non pro-
ductive population, i.e. paying for too many people out of the labor force1.
This situation creates high costs for the society as a whole, both in terms
of reduced long run growth and ¯scal burden. Western European countries,
meanwhile, have been somehow successful in trying to avoid these costs:
they have been witnessing a rising dependency ratio without marked out°ow
dynamics towards out of labor force. This is not the case for CEEs, distin-
guished by unprecedented °eeing °ows: however, their experience could shed
some light on the similarities with Western European Countries, especially
concerning the reform of pensions programs.
This paper gives a new interpretation of why the speed of transition was
slower than expected in CEEs and why it led to high unemployment. The
dismissal of jobs from the state sector should have generated a temporary
rise in unemployment, then a decline in unemployment should have occurred
later on. However, once the private sector started absorbing these workers,
a particular combination of policies seem to have hindered this absorption.
The main focus of this paper is to study labor force, unemployment equi-
librium and optimal speed of transition in a two-sector (state-private) reallo-
cation model with the following characteristics: out of the labor force (OLF)
dynamics are endogenized, agents choose their labor market status accord-
ing to idiosyncratic preferences and unemployment has a social cost when
aggregate uncertainty shows up. The analysis is applied to the Visegr¶ ad
1A contribution of how to endogenise the economic and budgetary costs of di®erent
government policies is o®ered by Castanheira (2003), where the endogenous relationship
between capital accumulation and labor market friction is taken directly into account.
3Countries2.
1.1 The Fiscal Burden of Social Policies
Liberalization, privatization and macroeconomic stabilization in CEEs were
accompanied by protracted high ¯scal budget de¯cits. As explained by
Chadha and Coricelli (1994), ¯scal variables and labor market dynamics
interacted through the social policy expenditure schemes.
The structure of the labor market in Eastern Europe has been rapidly
changing since the beginning of transition (1989-1990) due to privatization
and restructuring of large state enterprizes.
The governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak
Republic implemented radical labor market reforms since 1992. The unem-
ployment bene¯ts (UB) system has been revised according to the suggestions
of policy advisers, economists and social scientists. In the '90s the academic
literature has been unanimous in the prescription of a reduction in unem-
ployment bene¯ts to speed up the transition process and increase private
employment creation.
The cut in UB in 1992 for the Visegr¶ ad countries was followed by an
initial slight decline in unemployment. However, it was also accompanied by
a slowdown of the closure rate of state enterprizes and thus a reduced job
creation rate in the private ones.
1.2 Beyond the Optimal Speed of Transition Litera-
ture
Our paper investigates why the CEEs experienced the paradox of slowdown
in transition notwithstanding reduced UB. We argue that there is a weakness
in the analysis of existing literature.
The Optimal Speed of Transition literature -Aghion and Blanchard (1994)
3- has extensively explored the labor market dynamics in connection with
¯scal variables, while partially ignoring the fact that transition was strongly
characterized by a drop in the participation rate and hence an increase in
the dependency ratio.
2Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic (commonly referred to as Slovakia),
and Hungary are members of the Visegr¶ ad Group, created in February 1991 at the northern
Hungarian town.
3This paper is considered the seminal article of the OST literature stream.
4Some scholars illustrate the endogenous role of the categories of OLF,
e.g. Boeri (2000a), and others point out the role played by both aggregate
uncertainty and individual uncertainty, e.g. Roland (2002).
Furthermore, Boeri (1997) shows that heterogeneous agents behaved in
di®erent ways when faced with uncertainty and Aghion and Blanchard (1998)
explore the case when social opposition to restructuring restrained the whole
process of transition.
However, a key phenomenon has remained unexplored, namely that gov-
ernments had to cope with a peculiar trade-o®: on the one hand, they were
eager to push people away from the labor force, thus reducing the level of un-
employment and maintaining consensus around policy decisions; on the other
hand, relevant °ows to inactivity created growing budget costs, open-ended
entitlements (e.g. pensions) and higher non-employment bene¯ts-to-wages
ratio.
In our paper we investigate the interactions among unemployment, speed
of transition and non-employment policies 4 in light of the above trade-o®.
As a matter of fact, we start from the existing literature and, as a result, we
broadly extend the conceptual framework of the analysis.
The central idea of our paper is applied to the Visegr¶ ad countries during
the 1989-1998 period. These countries were relatively advanced in terms
of transition and they were su±ciently homogeneous in terms of economic
performance.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we sketch some stylized
facts about the transition process in the CEEs; in section 3 we explore a
model of unemployment dynamics extending the optimal speed of transi-
tion (OST) literature (Aghion and Blanchard (1994)); in section 4 we detail
the policy implications of our model and in the ¯nal section we present the
conclusions.
4Non-employment policies are targeted to all the not working categories, i.e. unem-
ployed and out of the labor force. It is possible to distinguish between "non-employment
subsidies/bene¯ts" (including unemployment bene¯ts, social assistance, early retirement,
disability pensions and sickness bene¯ts) and general pensions. Non-employment bene¯ts
plus pensions are the non-employment policies (see table (2)).
52 Stylized facts
Despite the importance of °ows outside the labor force, much of the literature
fails to take into account this factor. Indeed, the labor force -the employed
plus the unemployed- is not the only actor in the labor market.
The process of reform in the labor market in a transition economy usually
involves a huge labor force reallocation from the public to the private sector,
as well as large °ows of people exiting the labor market, as explained by Boeri
and Bruno (1997). This is due to the fact that the public sector is no longer
able to create exogenously full employment and it registers low productivity
and shortage of fresh investments. At the same time the private sector is not
able to absorb new unemployed instantaneously.
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) (A-B) have modelled this reallocation phe-
nomenon using a two-sector model as an analytical framework5. In their
paper, unemployment has two main e®ects: the ¯rst is lowering wages and
facilitating the creation of private employment, the second is raising the
payroll-taxes needed to ¯nance unemployment bene¯ts themselves. Payroll
taxes increase labor costs and hinder job creation. Nevertheless, a level of
unemployment in which the job creation function is maximized does exist
(bell shaped curve).
A-B concentrate on a restricted labor market (employed and unemployed),
ignoring the categories of OLF, which are explicitly considered in our paper.
In fact, unemployed and OLF are characterized by di®erent dynamics and
di®erent ¯scal impact on payroll taxes. Unemployment bene¯ts are tem-
porary costs, whereas the ¯nancing of the out of the labor force categories
gives rise to open-ended entitlements, such as pensions for early retirement
schemes or disability.
The 1992 reforms of UB systems, the drop in participation in the labor
force, the pension cost increases and the slow-down of transition are the four
stylized facts considered in the next sections.
2.1 The 1992 Reforms in the UB system
Following the suggestion of the academic/institutional consensus, at the be-
ginning of 1992 UB generosity was restrained and a payroll-tax system was
5They account for a partial equilibrium approach. For a general equilibrium approach
see Castanheira and Roland (2000).
6introduced to ¯nance unemployment bene¯ts. These reforms increased the
opportunity cost of being unemployed. A less generous bene¯t level was
instituted and the eligibility requirements for UB were restricted.
The immediate e®ect was the fall in the number of people registered as
seeking work and hence unemployed. The ¯scal weight of the UB dimin-
ished for most of the Visegr¶ ad countries and the pension cost increased. The
replacement rates for unemployment bene¯ts and pensions are reported in
¯gure 4. While there was a gradual drop in the incentive to become unem-
ployed, the pensions schemes became progressively more attractive.
2.2 Labor Force Participation Drop
In the 1989-1998 period, employment and participation rates6 drastically fell,
in particular for women, the young and the elderly 7, i.e. the two extremes
of the age distribution.
This period witnessed a °ow of people leaving the labor market, because
they were attracted by the early retirement schemes, disability pensions or by
other open-ended income support subsidies (e.g. social assistance). The four
economies experienced high unemployment levels among youth and showed
a consistent number of discouraged workers and long-term unemployment,
as Boeri, Burda and Kollo (1998), Aghion, Blanchard and Carlin (1997) and
Burda (1993) point out.
Feldmann (2004) reports that in CEEs the levels of unemployment rate,
including both long-term unemployment and youth unemployment rate (1997-
2002 average), are comparable to the levels registered in big Western Euro-
pean Countries (Germany, France and Italy). However, they are much higher
than the levels registered in the UK and the USA, where job markets are more
°exible.
Figure 1 shows the steady decline in the employment and participation
rates in the Visegr¶ ad Countries8. The pool of unemployed was not transitory
but stagnant and any decline was negligible.
6Unemployment was nearly absent before the transition, with the exception of Hungary.
This allows the use of the employment rate instead of the participation rate for comparison
of the pre-transition labor market with the actual one. In the early 90s the participation
and employment rates were practically the same.
7This e®ect is further increased by the fact that the retirement age in CEEs is statutorily
lower than the OECD, giving rise to a much lower actual level of retirement.
8Figure 1 is computed on the basis of the following ranges: men aged 15-59, women
aged 15-54, except for Poland, where the range for men is 18-64 and 18-59 for women.
7 
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Figure 1 The Decline in Participation/Employment Rates in The Visegrad Countries
Unweighted Average
Figure 1: Sources, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies







Figure 2: Extending the OST Reference Scheme.
8The Czech Republic and Poland experienced a limited drop in the par-
ticipation rate with respect to Hungary and the Slovak Republic, whilst the
decline in the employment rate was common to all four economies. This
phenomenon seems to be in alignment with the levels registered in Western
Europe. In fact, the average employment rate and participation rate in the
EU (15) were stable between 1992 and 2003, 59.5 to 62.5 and 68.4 to 70.6,
respectively (Eurostat ¯gures). In the USA the participation rate was well
above 75% (2002).
Figure (3) shows the destination of people after their dismissal from em-
ployment: social assistance, early retirement and disability signi¯cantly in-
creased, whilst the unemployment bene¯ts recipients diminished over time.
2.3 Pension Cost Increases
The cost of early retirement pensions, disability pensions and social assis-
tance (SA) grew rapidly in the ¯rst years of transition. Coricelli (1996)
states: 'The main pressure for the budget came from growing social expendi-
tures. Among those, the largest weight fell to pension expenditures, leading
some observers to talk of pensioners' power threatening the reform process'.
Feldmann (2004) points out: '[...], the large scale early retirement and dis-
ability schemes are so expensive that the tax burden on the economy, and
on labor in particular, had to be increased repeatedly in order to fund these
schemes'.
Expenditures for SA increased their relative weight within the government
budget. These kinds of bene¯ts were tailored for people already receiving UB
and who were in the short-term employment category. Furthermore, these
subsidies had large adverse e®ects on the ¯scal de¯cit due to their long-lasting
nature, as argued by Boeri and Edwards (1998), Chadha and Coricelli (1994)
and Chadha and Coricelli (1995).
Table 1 shows the expenditures for non-employment bene¯ts in the Visegr¶ ad
countries. Unemployment bene¯ts tended to be more expensive in the ¯rst
years of transition (e.g. the 2.22% of GDP registered in Hungary in 1992),
but their costs declined or stabilized in the following years. All the other
components -SA, early retirement (ER) and disability (Dis.)- grew in the
four countries, with the exception of ER in Poland.
Using the OECD standard measure of WAP (men and women 15-64) the computed decline










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Social Policies for Non-Employed 1990-95 (Boeri and Edwards
(1998)).
10Table 1: Non-employment Bene¯ts Expenditures (% of GDP)
Country Years UB SA ER Dis. Total
Czech Republic 1990 1.16 1.16
1991 0.23 0.06 ... 1.15 1.44
1992 0.18 0.16 ... 1.43 1.77
1993 0.16 0.19 ... 1.48 1.82
1994 0.18 0.22 ... 1.51 1.90
1995 0.15 ... ... 1.68 1.83
Hungarya 1990
1991 0.76 0.76
1992 2.22 0.02 0.05 ... 2.30
1993 1.96 0.15 0.11 ... 2.22
1994 0.99 0.31 0.15 ... 1.45
1995 ... 0.31 ... ...
Poland 1990 2.47 2.47
1991 1.38 ... ... 3.39 4.77
1992 1.71 ... 0.77 3.84 6.33
1993 1.72 ... 0.15 3.82 5.69
1994 1.77 ... 0.10 4.00 5.88
1995 ... ... ... ... ...
Slovak Republicb 1990 0.07 1.48 1.55
1991 0.86 ... 0.20 1.62 2.68
1992 0.52 0.46 0.22 1.82 3.01
1993 0.50 0.59 0.25 1.82 3.17
1994 0.39 0.87 ... 1.55 2.81
1995 0.32 0.78 ... 1.75 2.95
UB: Unemployment Bene¯ts.
SA: Social Assistance.
a Early Retirement (ER) for people who have been unemployed for at least six months.
b Disability (Dis.) includes partial disability.
Note: "..." Data not available.
Source: Boeri and Edwards (1998).
11Table 2: Expenditure for Social Policies in Three Groups of Countries, 1991-
1995 (% of GDP)
Countries Social Policiesa Non-employment Policies:
Non-employment Bene¯tsb Pensionsc
Visegr¶ ad 28.3 3.4 11.8
Balkansd 15.3 1.8 8.2
CISe 8.9 0.5 6.3
a Bulgaria and Czech Republic 1991/95, Hungary 1991/94, Poland and Romania 1990/94,
Slovak Republic 1990/95.
b Non-employment subsidies/bene¯ts include unemployment bene¯ts, social assistance,
early retirement, disability pensions and sickness bene¯ts.
c Average on 1991-95 period.
d Bulgaria and Romania.
e Commonwealth of Independent States.
Sources: Boeri and Edwards (1998), World Bank (1996); Unicef, Regional Monitoring
Report, EBRD Transition Report 1998.
Disability pensions were particularly expensive (e.g. in Poland they
reached 40 times the cost of early retirement). The growing tendency of al-
lowing for many disability pensions is more evident by the comparison with
industrialized countries: in OECD countries less than 4% of the working age
population receives such pensions, while in the Czech Republic the share was
7.5% (1997-2002 average) and in Hungary 10.4% (1997), as documented in
Feldmann (2004).
In this case, disability pensions seem to have been used as a substitute for
early retirement and unemployment bene¯ts, as learned from Western Euro-
pean Economies. In fact, in CEEs, the disability regimes could be based on
°exible selection procedures, where age is only one of the eligibility criteria9.
Table 2 illustrates three models of social expenditures10 between 1990 and
9However, in EU as well, the costs of disability pensions is a high % of GDP, 2.2%
(2001). The apparent incoherence of low proportion of recipients and high cost of disability
pensions as a % of GDP is due to the per-capita generosity of disability pensions scheme
in the EU 15 economies, as documented by European Commission (2002).
10The proportion of social policies that are not non-employment policies in the Visegr¶ ad
countries refer to a wide range of policy measures, including the so called active labor
market policies (ALMPs).
121995, showing that di®erent schemes were adopted in three groups of tran-
sition countries. Boeri (2000a) illustrates that the Visegr¶ ad group was able
to attain deeper structural change, faster reallocation of workers, relatively
stable GDP growth and higher redistribution of wealth with respect to other
groups of countries 11. This reveals some evidence about the higher capa-
bility of the Visegr¶ ad Countries to react to the high social costs created by
transition. They opted for initial higher payments in terms of social policies,
thereby gaining in the medium/long run in terms of structural change and
redistribution policies. In light of this Roland (2002) argues: 'The theory of
political economy suggests the possibility of a trade-o® between the speed of
reforms and the net present value of compensation transfers: namely, faster
reforms will involve higher compensation costs.'.
2.4 Speed of Transition Slow Down
The speed of transition slowed down in the 1995-1997 period. The rate of job
creation and destruction could be used as proxy of this speed of transition
concept. Following the methodology of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) it is
possible to look at the level of job creation/destruction in three di®erent
periods (see table (3)):
² 1989-92, the very beginning of transition;
² 1993-97, the second phase of transition;
² 1995-97, the end of the second phase.
The numbers are quite interesting: after the initial quick progress of
transition obtained through the dismissal of workers (high NEG rates) 12, in
a second phase the four economies could no longer sustain a su±cient job
turnover (low GROSS) and there was still a high dispersion of °ows (high
EXCESS). A stagnant unemployment pool and a low job turnover were clear
indications of a reduced speed in the reallocation of employment.
11 The Commonwealth of Independent States was characterized by an "L shaped" dy-
namics of GDP growth, while CEEs registered a "U shaped" recovery. Furthermore, in
the former group of countries there was a drastic decline in wages (nominal adjustment),
whereas the latter group registered a strong decrease in employment level (quantity ad-
justment). See ¯gure 1.
12Boeri and Terrell (2002) also show how quitting, instead of being laid-o®, has been

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Sources, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(WIIW), Countries in Transition 1998.
14Table 3: Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Visegr¶ ad Countries
Country Indexesa 1989-92b 1993-97 1995-97c
Czech Republic POS 2,6 6,5 4,5
NEG 11.8 5.3 6.9
GROSS 14.4 11.8 11.4
NET -9.2 1.2 -2.5
EXCESS 5.2 10.6 8.9
Hungary POS 3.9 j1.9 2.1
NEG 17.7 j6.7 2.9
GROSS 21.6 j8.5 5.0
NET -13.7 j-4.8 -0.9
EXCESS 7.8 j3.7 4.1
Poland POS 1.4 7.5 5.0
NEG 16.1 3.9 2.3
GROSS 17.5 11.4 7.3
NET -14.7 3.6 2.7
EXCESS 2.8 7.7 4.7
Slovakia POS 2.1 6.3 4.2
NEG 16.4 2.0 2.0
GROSS 18.5 8.3 6.2
NET -14.3 4.4 2.3
EXCESS 4.2 3.9 3.9
a See Appendix for details on indexes computation.
b Data for the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic from Boeri, Burda and
Kollo (1998), Forum Report CEPR. Data for Hungary based on ILO Yearbook. The
vertical line denotes a break in the series: for Hungary there is a break between 1989-92
and 1993-97.
c 1994-1997 for Poland and the Slovak Republic.
Sources: Computations based on ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1998.
153 The model
We start building the model on the following framework. At the beginning,
the economy is completely characterized by full state employment and absent
private employment. Employees expelled from the state sector face the choice
of being unemployed versus being out of the labor force -the outside-option
(see ¯gure (2)). In other words, workers ¯red by state enterprizes have two
alternatives: either to remain in the labor market, receiving UB, or to exit
with an adequate premium. However, agents di®er in their perception of the
value of their future utility, i.e. they have an idiosyncratic value function
guiding their choice.
The policy maker is eager to avoid high unemployment and social unrest,
restraining the reallocation process.
The policy maker is also eager to avoid excessive °ows toward the OLF,
due to the massive increases that budget costs and payroll taxes would su®er.
The concern of the policy maker is both the optimal speed and the optimal
method of transition. The government must decide on passive labor market
policies (PLMPs)13 with the ultimate goal of the fastest possible (OST idea)
reallocation of the labor force from the public to the private sector.
3.1 The Building Blocks of the Model
The dynamic of the model is divided into 2 phases where agents are able and
unable, respectively, to go for the outside-option. In the ¯rst phase individual
uncertainty prevails, while in the second, the aggregate uncertainty appears.
Let analyze the characteristics of the two phases in the next two sections.
Phase I, Individual Uncertainty, The Outside-Option :
² The policy-maker acts on the relative generosity of pensions and
unemployment bene¯t schemes and thus she/he a®ects the incen-
tives of the labor force members. High pensions with respect to
UB allows for workers °ows toward the status of out of the la-
bor force: relatively generous pensions induce laid-o® workers to
choose early retirement or disability pensions instead of becoming
unemployed.
13Passive labor market policies and active labor market policies -such as training pro-
grams or direct intervention on the re-quali¯cation of labor force- complement each other.
This second category is not modelled in our paper.
16² Agents dismissed from state sector are heterogeneous and thus
perceive di®erently the value of becoming part of the categories
of OLF. A fraction of workers go for OLF rather than for un-
employment. Figure (2) represents the above mentioned outside
option.
² At the beginning of transition participation rate starts dropping
and the labor force starts shrinking. i.e. it is not ¯xed over time.
² There is no social opposition because workers are given the possi-
bility to decrease the risk of their non-employment status. Con-
sequently, they do not implement any social opposition protest to
dismissal, such as pressure to stop restructuring of state ¯rms.
Phase II, Aggregate Uncertainty, The Social Opposition :
² Participation rate stabilizes, the government is satis¯ed: it has
reached the target OLF level, OLF (see ¯gure (1) in 1997).
² There is a reverse in policies, the eligibility criteria to obtain ER,
disability pensions or SA are changed. This manoeuvre imme-
diately stops the shrinking of the labor force, as it excludes the
possibility to °ee. There is a sort of saturation of OLF.
² The heterogeneous evaluation (individual uncertainty) of agents
concerning OLF is no longer playing any role, because nobody
has the possibility to pursue the outside option any more.
² Faced with no possibility of lowering their risk of unemployment,
now workers do implement social opposition to restructuring. Un-
employment has a social cost, i.e. it is an obstacle to the transi-
tion. This is a political economy style hypothesis concerning the
appearance of the aggregate uncertainty when the instruments to
deal with the individual uncertainty are lacking.
In the model, the sequencing of policy implementation will be therefore
crucial in determining unemployment level and the share of people in the two
categories (the unemployed and the out-of-labor).
[0]
Phase I Individual Uncertainty
9 Outside¡Option)@ Opposition
//// [T]
Phase II Aggregate Uncertainty
@ Outside¡Option)9 Opposition
//// [T + m]
173.2 The Dynamics of the Model
The general framework of the model is similar to Aghion and Blanchard
(1994). Their idea is derived from Harris and Todaro (1970), where an ef-
¯ciency wage-led migration from rural to urban areas in developing coun-
tries is modelled. Boeri and Terrell (2002) have indeed emphasized that
the urban-rural divide has been present in transition countries as well, where
'[...] non-employment has become more and more concentrated in rural areas
while capitals display very dynamic labor markets'.
However, the assumption made by the OST literature concerning constant
labor force is highly inadequate in accounting for the change in the relative
weight of employment, unemployment and out of the labor force categories.
By normalizing the total working age population at each point in time,
the following equality holds:
E(t) + N(t) + U(t) + OLF(t) = 1 (1)
where henceforth E stands for those employed in the state sector, N
for those in the private sector, U the unemployed and OLF the out-of-the-
labor-force categories. Initial conditions are chosen so that N0 = 0, U0 = 0,
OLF0 = j > 0 (j < OLF, the target OLF, see section 3.5).
3.2.1 State Sector Employment
Phase I In the ¯rst phase, where the reallocation of unemployment is low
and the social opposition mechanism is absent, the formulation of state




i.e. an exogenous constant -s- rate of state ¯rm enterprizes closure.
Phase II When the target OLF is hit, the individual uncertainty turns into
aggregate uncertainty. It is thus possible to introduce the opposition
mechanism into the model. Equation (2) is modi¯ed accordingly:
dE
dt
= ¡[s ¡ vU(t)] (3)
18with the parameter v ¸ 0 and [s¡vU(t)] ¸ 0, otherwise the restructuring-
privatization process would stop and eventually reverse. This new for-
mulation of the speed of transition now depends on time via unemploy-
ment:











//// [T + m]
The motivation for this modi¯cation is the following: the government is
concerned about high unemployment because there is opposition to privatiza-
tion when unemployment turns to be too high. This hypothesis considers the
power of lobbying within medium and large state ¯rms as recognized by De-
watripont and Roland (1992) and Dewatripont and Roland (1992). Roland
(2002) cites Fidrmuc (2000):
'Insider managers use the threat of reducing economic activity
and destroying jobs to extract subsidies and favorable legislation.
Politicians can respond to such subsidies under such plausible and
popular rubrics as saving jobs and providing a better business
climate.' and '[...] the support for reformist parties is negatively
a®ected by unemployment and by the proportion of retirees and
blue collars and agricultural workers [...].'
This mechanism has unfortunately created a vicious circle: high unem-
ployment often leads to high subsidies, softer budget constraints14 and thus a
slower speed of transition. Put in other words, the higher the unemployment,
the higher the opposition to restructuring will be.
If workers are called to vote on the speed of dismissal from state enter-
prizes, potential gainers and potential losers will participate in this decision.
The number of voters advocating a slower restructuring process will increase
when unemployment is high. The potential losers gain power and thus the
speed of transition reacts inversely to the level of unemployment.
14Kornai has widely investigated the nature of the so called "soft budget constraint", the
typical legacy of the communist period in the very ¯rst years of transition. The tightening
of the budget was one of the principal instruments used to induce old state enterprizes to
competition.
193.2.2 Private Sector Employment
The private sector dynamic equation is the same in phase I and II:
²
N= a(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ w) (4)
where a is parameter, yN = 115 the constant average product of labor in
the private sector, ¿ the payroll taxes per worker (indirect cost) and w the
wage per worker (direct cost).
3.2.3 The Fiscal Side
The budget constraint of the government16 in both phase I and II is:
Ub + OLF¯ = (1 ¡ U ¡ OLF)¿ (5)
¿ =
Ub + OLF¯
(1 ¡ U ¡ OLF)
(6)
The budget constraint (5) states that pensions ¯ (not only the UB b as in
Aghion and Blanchard (1994)) are ¯nanced through payroll taxes and not by
general government funds or de¯cit. Actively employed are the only source
of pensions and UB ¯nancing17.
3.3 The Value Functions of N, U and OLF
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) consider the present value of being unemployed
versus the present value of being employed in the private sector. In the
following formulation people out of the labor force are considered as well,
hence a further arbitrage condition has to be taken into account.
The model encompasses three value functions: employment in the new
private sector VN, unemployment VU and out of the labor force VOLF,
15According to the e±ciency wages mechanism the average product of the private sector
is higher than the average product of the state sector, yN > yS.
16The political economics literature concerning intermediate preferences applied to risk
heterogeneity and social insurance deals exactly with the same problem of optimal decision
on unemployment bene¯ts under government budget constraint, where the UB transfer to
unemployed are ¯nanced with taxes on employed.
17However, equation (5) could be easily amended to take into account budget de¯cits.









(VN ¡ VU) +
dVU
dt












U is the probability of becoming employed and the term "i 2 [0;1]18
re°ects the idiosyncratic valuation of individual i for OLF19. In a similar
framework, Boone (2004) considers a two sector model where risk-averse
agents increase their mobility according to the level of unemployment bene-
¯ts. In his paper uncertainty is modelled through risk-aversion. In our paper
the idiosyncratic term could incorporate many individual speci¯c elements,
like age, risk aversion, skills-education, gender, etc.
The term (VN ¡ VU) = c is constant. This is an incentive compatibility
constraint, stating that there is a constant willingness to seek a job, in order




dt = 0, taking the
di®erence between (7) and (8) and solving for the wage








where the second term on the RHS denotes the risk premium of being
unemployed.
It is also stated that b < ¯ < w 21. This inequality is empirically testable
and it is also an hypothesis adopted by the previous theoretical literature,
18I thank a referee for this point.
19In Boeri and Terrell (2002) the aspect of heterogeneity is very important. At the
beginning of transition the °ows toward OLF were higher than the °ows toward U and
the majority of workers deciding to exit the labor force were low skilled.
20 The analogous incentive compatibility constraint between the value of being OLF and
of being U is: VOLF ¡ VU = C , solving for rVOLF ¡ rVU obtaining ¯ = b + rC + pc ¡ "i
and considering w¡¯ = r(c¡C)¡"i with b < ¯ < w hence C < c =) VU < VOLF < VN,
as expected.
21The value of ¯ can be both considered pension (ER, Dis.) or SA. In the ¯rst case the
inequality considered holds for all the analyzed countries excluding the ¯rst two years in
Hungary (see ¯gure 4), but if ¯ stands for SA the inequality should be modi¯ed as follows
21including Chadha and Coricelli (1994). The spread between wages and UB
is a result of labor market dynamics, while the ¯ to b spread is exogenously
determined by the policy maker.
3.3.1 The Indi®erent Agent
















if the integration constants are made equal to zero, the equality VU =
VOLF gives the idiosyncratic term of the indi®erent agent:
" = b ¡ ¯ + pc (11)




U 2 (0;1)) is bounded as well:




2 (0;1) ) (¯ ¡ b) 2 (0;1)
we have the boundaries for the spread pensions-UB. Solving equation (11)
for p and the two corner values of " we know that the probability to ¯nd a
job must be su±ciently high (p >
¯¡b
c ), otherwise there is no incentive to




¯ < b < w. In order to have a clear-cut distinction between U and OLF the ¯rst case is
more appropriate and easy to model, even if the SA could be also considered a kind of
escape from the labor force, i.e. an OLF condition.
22The _ N=U ratio is constant if the government is able to maintain the economy at the
optimal speed of transition level and there is no slowing down. The qualitative results of
the model are not a®ected by these caveats, see Appendix (6.3).
23This is done for convenience; any normalization on another positive interval would
only a®ect the support of the distribution of ", on which the density function will be
computed, see section (3.3.2).
22The ¯ ¡ b term is a policy instrument, while
²
N
U and c are determined by
labor market conditions. As far as the policy instrument is concerned, any
action trying to encourage °ows toward OLF will set high pensions and, con-
versely, a policy encouraging °ows toward U will require high unemployment
bene¯ts. As far as the labor market dynamic is concerned, the higher the
probability of ¯nding a job -p- and the value of employment -c-, the higher
the °ows toward unemployment become.
A high ¯¡b spread (high premium of pensions with respect to unemploy-
ment bene¯ts) induces a higher number of agents to choose pension schemes.
This is because the wider the ¯¡b spread, the lower the idiosyncratic term of
the indi®erent agent becomes, thus the higher the number of people choosing
OLF (the lower the number of people choosing unemployment) will be.
3.3.2 Unemployment and OLF Flows
In the previous paragraph we developed a qualitative analysis of relevant
labor market °ows but we were not able to say who is ¯nally going to chose
the outside-option. On the basis of the idiosyncratic term of the indi®erent
agent, it is possible to determine that two generic agents i and j will behave
in the following way:
² if "i < " ) i 2 n1: people passing from E to U;
² if " < "j ) j 2 n2: people passing from E to OLF exploiting the
outside option;














can be computed according to the distribution of the "i's among agents:








f (±;¼) being the density function in ", based on a vector of parameters24.
This formulation states that agents with "i < " will become unemployed,
while agents with "j ¸ " will choose the status of OLF.
3.4 The Dynamics of Unemployment
The equation that regulates unemployment dynamics can now be derived by
rewriting the time derivative of the normalization equation (1)
_ E + _ N + _ U + _ OLF = 0
) _ U = (s ¡ vU) ¡ _ N ¡ _ OLF
= (s ¡ vU)x1 ¡ _ N
) _ OLF = (s ¡ vU)x2
where x1 is the ratio between people moving E ! U and the total number
of people moving out from the state sector and x2 is the ratio between people
moving E ! OLF and the total number of people moving out from the state
sector (x1 + x2 = 1)25.
3.5 The Government Strategy in the Two Phases
The initial reallocation process implies an increase of the pool of both un-
employed and OLF. The government provides an incentive to choose OLF,
24With a uniform distribution it would be x1 = " and x2 = 1 ¡ ".
25In the formulation of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) some workers become unemployed
s(1 ¡ ¸) and the remaining s¸ are job-to-job shifts (as explained by Boeri (2000b)), pro-
ducing at the y = 1 average product level, as in the private sector. However, the private
job creation H =
²
N '[...] is the increase in the private sector employment not due to pri-
vatization/restructuring of state ¯rms', page 14 (H is not a function of ¸). Alternatively,
in our paper all the workers of restructured ¯rms have passed through unemployment in
order to ¯nd a job in the private sector, i.e. ¸ = 0.
24setting ¯ ¡ b su±ciently high. This, however, is just temporary. The policy
maker has no interest in excessively decreasing the participation rate, also
due to the long run costs in terms of growth and ¯scal burden; the larger
the pool of people in the OLF, the lower the potential GDP that can be
produced in the future. Attempting to speed up transition today may thus
end up reducing GDP in the long run and driving up overall payroll taxes.
This consideration probably induced governments to stop widening the
gap from 1995 on, when a stabilization of the upward trend in pension/UB
ratio growth was registered (see table 426).
This e®ect can be achieved assuming that the policy maker has in mind a
target level for the OLF (OLF) and once this target is reached, the supply of
early retirement and disability pensions is exogenously set to 0: the outside-
option is no more o®ered27 and the in°ows in the OLF are 0. This seems to
have occurred: in fact in the 1997 the participation rate stabilized between
70 and 75% (see ¯gure (1)).
In terms of the model:
phase I : OLF(t) < OLF ) 9 Outside ¡ Option
) " 2 (0;1)
) F"(") = x1(t) > 0;F"(1 ¡ ") = x2(t) > 0
phase II : OLF = OLF
) @ Outside ¡ Option
) " = 1
) F"(1) = x1 = 1;F"(0) = x2 = 0
The °ows x1 x2 are determined according to equation (11), the function








//// [T + m]
26The only exception is the Slovak Republic where the pension/UB ratio over 250% was
greatly re-adjusted between 1995-1997.
27This hypothesis could appear unrealistic if we consider a natural rate of retirement.







//// [T + m]
Equation (11) has to be amended for the case in which the outside-option
is lacking once OLF = OLF:
" =
½
1 OLF = OLF
pc ¡ (¯ ¡ b) OLF < OLF
In order to enter in phase II the government has simply to allow " to hit
its upper bound (1), leaving pensions and unemployment bene¯ts unchanged
but not o®ering the outside-option any more (e.g. drastically reducing the
access to ER, Dis. and SA)28.
3.6 Phase I System
The dynamic system for the four variables E;N;U;OLF is represented below
when OLF < OLF (t 2 [0;T)):
8
> > > > > <

















under the condition x1 + x2 = 1 and the normalization equation (1).
This system can not be solved for an equilibrium in _ U = 0, because of the






1 ¡ rc ¡
b + (b + ¯)[sx2t + k]
1 ¡ U ¡ [sx2t + k]
¸
28A more realistic hypothesis of a change in the spread in order to a®ect the incentive
would be mathematically more complex, but it would not change the qualitative results
of the model. This simplifying assumption is crucial for di®erent reasons. The policy
instrument is decided ¯xed and ¯nal in terms of ¯ ¡ b spread, but the important choice
concerns the timing of the switch between phase I and II. Furthermore, we want to rule
out from the model the dynamic implications in term of choices for perfect foresighted
agents knowing in advance the government policy in the future.
26that still depends on time. A government unconcerned with the overall
level of OLF, i.e. with the excessive drop of the participation rate, would
leave the labor market without an equilibrium in terms of unemployment29.
The economic logic is the following. The strategic policy of pushing people
OLF is a temporary action. If this was not the case, the participation rate
could potentially drop inde¯nitely: through payroll taxes fewer and fewer
workers would ¯nance the larger and larger people OLF. This is not only
not-sustainable, but damaging to job creation in the private sector. The
policy maker is thus forced to block the process at some point before it easily
spins out of control.
3.7 Phase II System
As soon as the target OLF is reached the policy maker shifts policies (t 2
[T;T + m)) and the speed of transition is a®ected by the social opposition
function30. In the new system the identi¯cation of the equilibria for unem-
ployment is now possible:
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
²















As a result an unemployment equilibrium level can be investigated.
3.7.1 The Unemployment Equilibria




N= (s ¡ vU) (14)
When
²
U= 0 occurs, the °ow of people entering unemployment equals the
°ow exiting from it31.
29I thank a referee for this point.
30In the model there is no foresight concerning the moment of policy reverse. However,
if this was the case, a even faster phenomenon of escape from the labor force would be
generated.
31As pointed out in Boeri (2000b) the scale e®ect has to be taken into account. Until
27In our model the inverted U-shaped _ N curve is downward shifted, in other
words, for every level of unemployment the private job creation rate is lower
with respect to A-B. The new OLF¯ component has to be ¯nanced through
payroll taxes, thus hindering the absorption of workers by private ¯rms and
reducing job creation32.
The unemployment solutions are obtained through the intersection of the
inverted bell shaped curve of
²
N derived in the system and equation (14)33.




1 ¡ rc ¡
b + (b + ¯)OLF
1 ¡ U ¡ OLF
¸
(15)
In the next paragraph the graphical solution of this equation is analyzed.
3.8 The Implication on the Speed of Transition
In phase I the policy maker is progressively compelled to slow down the speed
of transition (¯gure (5) and (6)). The new (but lower) level of optimal speed
of transition has to be chosen at the maximum point of the downward shifted
inverted U shaped curve in each moment in time. Notice that if the speed of







1 ¡ rc ¡
b + (b + ¯)OLF
(1 ¡ U ¡ OLF)
¸
there is a unique U¤ semi-stable equilibria: for U < U¤ there is conver-
gence to the equilibria, for U > U¤ divergence. If the speed is slower than
the optimum, two equilibria are generated, U1 is stable, while U2 is unstable.
In the second phase, the social opposition element emerges (¯gure (7))
because of the increased unemployment pool. Consequently, there is new
separation of the equilibria34.
the private sector has reached a size equal to the public one, a higher growth rate is not
su±cient to avoid the rise of unemployment.
32Blanchard and Diamond (1992) used a similar framework.
33The rate of private job creation will be zero for the two values of unemployment:
U1 = 0 and U2 = 1 ¡ OLF ¡
b+(b+¯)OLF
1¡rc .
34In the case of forward looking employers Aghion and Blanchard (1994) show that
where expected changes in the value of private sector jobs is considered, both equilibria
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Figure 8: The New Equilibria, 0 ! T + m
30If now the policy maker seeks the new optimal speed s¤ ! s¤¤ (¯gure
(8)), the separation of the two equilibria remains35. In other words the trap
of high unemployment is still present. The new "optimal" unemployment
point (U1 = U¤¤) is a proper stable equilibrium (no more semi-stable as in
Aghion and Blanchard (1994)).
3.9 The Long Run: Implicit Costs
36
The equilibrium unemployment (
²
N= 0) cannot be sustained forever. At




E= 0 (E = 0), implying
²
U< 0, until U(T + m) = 0. This is the steady state of the model, where the
economy reaches a natural zero rate of unemployment.
At the very end of the transition process the following long run results
show up:
U
L(T + m) = 0
OLF
L(T + m) = OLF
GDP
L(T + m) = yEE(T + m) + yNN(t + m)
= 1 ¡ OLF
w





The GDP 37 in the long run is derived by computing the sum of the state
and private production: the ¯rst is 0 and the second is ynN = 1(1 ¡ EL ¡
UL ¡ OLF L) ) 1 ¡ OLF. The wage is derived through equations (4) and
(6) where the long values are substituted.
It is now possible to conclude that for OLF < 1 both GDP and wealth,
expressed as wages, are a negative function of both pension largesse and the
size of the categories out of the labor force.
35For s
¤¤
v ¸ 1 ¡ OLF ¡
b+(b+¯)OLF
1¡rc .
36I thank a referee for suggesting to add this section.
37GDP and GDP per capita coincide for the normalization hypothesis.
314 Policy Sequencing
From 1989 till the end of 1991, unemployment bene¯t schemes were quite gen-
erous with respect to other social instruments (i.e. ¯ ¡b was low, because of
high UB). This increased unemployment and allowed the reallocation of la-
bor from the public to the private sector. Initial low levels of unemployment
bene¯ts would have prevented the beginning of a transition, due to inade-
quate social safety net. However, high UB led to high government budget
de¯cits (the payroll tax system was not set yet) and little incentive to search
for work once unemployed, due to high replacement rates of UB systems.
The 1989-1991 is a kind of "phase 0" of the model where equation (5)
was not constraining the ¯nancing of UB, if not marginally, and there was no
hindering of the private job creation process. In fact, in the very ¯rst period
of transition the budget was not binding and UB were paid with government
money. Unemployment and budget de¯cits grew. In this starting period the
drop in the participation rate was limited (¯gure (1)).
In 1992, labor market institutional reforms reduced UB generosity and
increased the (relative) generosity of pensions (early retirement, disability
pensions and social assistance). Furthermore, the payroll tax system was
introduced. This policy change was meant to reduce the pressure on unem-
ployment, inducing people to exit from the labor market. Unfortunately, the
costs were both on the short and medium-long run side.
In the short run, there was a burden on the budget de¯cit38 and payroll
taxes generated a lower growth of the private sector, contrary to the previous
1989-1992 period. All this led to an overall forced slow-down in speed of
transition (¯gure (6)).
In the medium-long run another e®ect was noted: the larger the pool of
people OLF, the lower was the potential GDP that was produced later. This
is probably the more dangerous but less evident risk the CEEs have been
coping with so far. In fact, they seem to have started decreasing generosity
of pensions and open ended entitlements (phase II of the model) around
1995-1997 to avoid long run costs (see section (3.9)).
The public sector slowed down the restructuring/privatization process
also because of the appearance of social opposition in this phase when the
outside-option was no longer feasible.
38As already pointed out, the model does not take into account budget de¯cit in order
to show the extreme case result of increased pension costs. See footnote (5).
32Fiscal responsibility has often been advocated as a pre-requisite of an
adequate process of transition within a policy of stabilization. However, had
the budget de¯cit been less rigidly constrained, the governments could have
sustained a faster transition in terms of restructuring. A completely rigid
¯scal constraint has, in some cases, perversely led to the reduction of the
speed of transition, because of the fear of social opposition to restructuring.
Alternative explanations of this reduced speed were already presented in
the literature. Rodrik (1995) analyzed the e®ect of subsidies to the state
sector in slowing down the transition. Commander and Schankerman (1997)
investigated the e®ect of high social bene¯ts (largely ¯rm-speci¯c) and ¯rms
dominated by insiders: this phenomenon has generated informal sector par-
ticipation and has hindered restructuring, to some degree by inducing higher
set-up costs for new private ¯rms. Aghion and Blanchard (1998) theorized a
framework in which the insiders -potential losers of this process of dismissal
of public jobs- imposed political constraints so that the outsiders would not
have easy access to the shares' market.
We have attempted to provide a further and di®erent explanation of the
unexpected phenomenon of the slowing pace of restructuring.
5 Conclusions
This paper has developed a theoretical re-investigation of the optimal speed
of transition (OST) model of Aghion and Blanchard (1994).
Out of labor force categories were endogenized within the model and
workers ¯red from the state sector chose inter-temporally which labor market
status -out of the labor force or unemployment- could guarantee higher net
present value. In a ¯rst phase, agents faced individual uncertainty: their id-
iosyncratic evaluations determined whether to exploit the outside-option. In
a second phase, there was an unexpected policy reversal as the outside-option
was no longer available: aggregate uncertainty raised and social opposition
to unemployment showed up.
The model broadly extends the results of the optimal speed of transition
literature. The optimal speed is no more ¯xed and ¯nal: in the ¯rst phase,
it must be progressively reduced; in the second phase, multiple equilibria
occur, with the drawback of increased risk of a non-optimal high level of
unemployment.
The model predicts that policies oriented toward tight government budget
33constraints hinder the pace of job reallocation. However, policies meant
to keep a su±ciently high participation rate are bene¯cial to the speed of
transition and to the reduction of long run costs.
In terms of policy implications, tight ¯scal policies seem to have driven the
CEEs into a slow-down of transition and a drastic drop in the participation
rate, moving up the dependency ratio. Thus the necessity to ¯nance open-
ended entitlements and the shrunk labor force increased the long run costs.
In other words, the attempt to speed up transition in the short-run lowered
the potential GDP later on. It could be the case that the Visegr¶ ad Countries'
governments have only partially predicted and tackled these long term e®ects.
However, the experience of Central European Economies shares some sim-
ilarities with Western European Countries, especially concerning the reform
of pensions programs. In fact, this is one of the critical points of the so-
cial policy agenda within the enlarged EU, probably due to the fear of the
aforementioned potential high long run costs.
346 Appendix
6.1 Summarizing the Two Phases
[0]
Phase I //// [T]






























//// [T + m]
6.2 Job Creation and Job Destruction Indicators, Davis
and Haltiwanger (1992)













'esp' stands for expanding sectors and 'con' for contracting sectors. The
indicators are then constructed: GROSS = POS + NEG, NET = POS ¡
NEG, EXCESS = GROSS ¡ jNETj.
356.3 The Value Function of Unemployment, VU





(VN ¡ VU). Even
if unemployment were in equilibrium, the term p would not be constant for
the entire transition period.
In phase I there is a progressive reduction of p (see ¯gure (6)).
In phase II p is constant only when the system reaches an equilibrium
(this was not the case in phase I). However in phase II " = 1 and there is no
more outside option, everyone is compelled to go for unemployment and the
VU is not playing any role.








rVU = b + pc +
dVU
dt
Notwithstanding this, the approximation used in our model (equation
(16) with ® = 0) is an over-evaluation of VU (p is decreasing in t), and it
under-estimate the escaping process generated through x2 = F" (1 ¡ ") = R 1
" f (";:)d".





















































Splitting the integral in two parts, phase I [0;T) when
dp
dt < 0 decreasing




































Unfortunately _ N depends on OLF(t) which still depends on time in phase
I. There is no way of computing a closed form solution for VU.
However, the model would only be a®ected in the transitional dynamics
of phase I, [0;T): without the overvaluation of VU, the time needed to reach
the OLF would be shorter, but the main qualitative conclusions of our model
would be un-a®ected.
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